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Abstract
A recent article in the Lancet, by David Stuckler, Larry King and Martin McKee,
investigated anew the fluctuations in adult male mortality rates that have come to
characterise the so-called post-communist mortality crisis. Adopting a cross-country,
time-series perspective the authors examined how the economic policy strategies of the
1990s impacted upon observed fluctuations in mortality. They conclude that the adoption
of a strategy of rapid (mass) privatisation contributed to the adverse mortality trends. We
subject that finding to closer scrutiny using the same data from which the Stuckler et al
claim stems. We find that their claim that mass privatisation adversely affected male
mortality trends in the post-Communist world does not stand up to closer examination. It
is not supported empirically and is at odds with what we know about both transition in
the post-communist world and about health trends over time in this region.
Postscript
A summary of this paper (unanimously recommended for publication by 4 anonymous
Lancet referees) with an associated web-appendix is now published in the Lancet
(375(9712):372) as a ‘Correspondence’ piece. It appears alongside work arriving at a
similar conclusion by John Earle and Scott Gehlbach. In response, Stuckler et al have
also been granted a correspondence piece with an associated web-appendix in which they
respond to our findings. Unfortunately, the arguments put forward by Stuckler et al in
their response to both our paper and that of Earle and Gehlbach are misrepresentative and
muddled. On further examination, we learned from the Lancet Editorial Team that their
response was not peer reviewed. While we respect the authors’ right to reply, a necessary
trademark of academic discussion is that the arguments, views and opinions therein are
subject to collective objectivisation. This condition has clearly not been met. We have
little interest in personal and even less in ideological exchange, far more in the objective
pursuit of what the available data can teach us about the real world. Thus, rather than
spend our time responding to their points case by case, we feel it suffice to reiterate the
following: The work of Gerry, Mickiewicz and Nikoloski and that of Earle and Gehlbach
was developed independently and iteratively during 2009. It was subject to presentation
at multiple academic fora, and most importantly, in both cases, was subject to the
external peer review processes of the Lancet. That process of peer review resulted in
strong, independent recommendations for publication on the basis that the claims of SKM
had been shown not to be robust. The response from SKM, compiled in little over a
month, has not been subject to any sort of peer review process by the journal in which it
was published.
1. Introduction1
During the 1990s the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and
the Caucasus (CEE) played host to a decade of political, economic and social upheaval. Across
parts of the region the ‘transition’ that followed the decline and ultimate implosion of the
command economy system and political disintegration of the Soviet system also coincided with a
demographic crisis prompted by steep increases in mortality rates. In Russia, the most extreme
and well-documented case, life expectancy for males collapsed from 64.2 in 1989 to 58.3 in 1995.
This health ‘crisis’ though was neither restricted to Russia nor was it restricted to the post-
communist period. Right across the so-called ‘mortality belt’ – the western countries of the
former Soviet Union2 – life expectancy for both males and females fluctuated considerably both
during the 1980s (a late Soviet period) and the 1990s (the ‘transition’ period), following a trend
decline from the late 1960s. At the same time, despite being subjected to similar economic and
political disruption at the start of transition, the post-communist countries of CEE bordering the
mortality belt both from the west and from the east, suffered much less substantive decreases in
their life expectancy during the 1990s (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Male Life Expectancy
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Source: WHO Health for All Database, January 2009
Three things are clear from figure 1. Firstly, the countries of the mortality belt have had lower life
expectancy for at least the last 3-4 decades. Secondly, there were substantial fluctuations in life
expectancy from the mid-1980s through to the mid-1990s. Thirdly, in the mid-1990s life
expectancy in both groups started to rise again, albeit more slowly in the mortality belt countries.3
Stuckler, King and McKee,4 writing in the Lancet, compile the CEE data for the decade starting
in 1990 and using that data find that “mass privatisation programmes were associated with a
short-term increase in mortality rates in working-aged men”5 and thus argue that the social costs
borne by countries adopting rapid privatisation have been far greater.
While welcoming the attempt to examine the role of economic strategies in driving health
outcomes, we don’t share the view of Bobak and Marmot6 that “Stuckler and colleagues argue
convincingly that the speed of privatisation was an important determinant of mortality changes in
the transition” nor that they adequately “tackle the difficulties of measurement and confounding”.
On the contrary, in this paper, we demonstrate (using their data) that the claim that mass
privatisation adversely affected male mortality trends in the post-Communist world does not
withstand closer scrutiny. It is not supported empirically and is at odds with what we know about
both transition in the post-communist world and about health trends over time in this region.
2. Transition and mortality
Stuckler et al set themselves a difficult task: namely, that of isolating the effect on health of
complex policy choices made in a turbulent socioeconomic and political environment, against the
backdrop of fluctuating and often deteriorating health outcomes observed since the late 1960s.
They are by no means the first to tread this path. As early as 1996, Jeffrey Sachs observed an
inverse relationship between life expectancy and the speed of economic reform.7 Elizabeth
Brainerd examined the link between market reforms and mortality patterns and found the
evidence to be more mixed.8 In particular she observed that effective market reforms were
associated with both increases (e.g. the Baltic republics) and decreases (e.g. Poland and Slovenia)
in mortality rates. While noting that there is no obvious, clearly identifiable explanation for the
mortality patterns, she also found that macroeconomic destabilisation (inflation rates), the crime
rate, unemployment and economic growth were correlated with mortality rates in the early 1990s.
In addition, the particularly strong correlation between deaths from cardiovascular disease and the
inflation rate, the crime rate and the unemployment rate suggests that the uncertainity related
stress experienced during the upheavals in countries which were less successful in their
“transitional” economic policies may have been an important factor in the mortality crisis of the
1990s.9,10,11
In more recent research, Brainerd and Cutler12 review the literature and revisit the data, to explore
four potential explanations: the collapse of the health care system13; individual lifestyles reflected
by diet, smoking and alcohol intake14; material deprivation15 and psychosocial stress.16 They find
that increased alcohol (and surrogate alcohol) use and the stress associated with socio-economic
upheaval account for around half of the increase in mortality but that a large residual remains
unexplained. McKee and Shkolnikov argue that premature male deaths stem from injuries and
violence associated with alcohol consumption; and cardiovascular disease associated with diets
high in fat and low in fruit and vegetables.17 Correspondingly, Zatonski et al claim that the
decline in deaths from cardiovascular disease in Poland since 1991 is related to a positive change
in diet.18 Most recently of all, Zaridze et al associate over half of male, 15-54 year old deaths, in
three Russian cities with alcohol abuse.19
There is then an established literature examining the explanations for the mortality patterns in
CEE and a cautious consensus that the observed mortality patterns are a function of alcohol,
dietary related factors and stress associated with socio-economic upheaval. There is also some
early evidence of a positive link between the aggregate indicators of progress in market reforms
and better health outcomes. Stuckler et al, while not denying the potential importance of other
factors, are the only authors who endeavour to link the transitional part of the mortality crisis to
one very specific policy choice taken in the early 1990s.
3. Statistical analysis20
The stylised empirical facts
In their discussion, Stuckler et al provide a graph comparing life expectancy, between mass
privatisers and non-mass privatisers, for the years 1991 – 2000 and claim this as further evidence
of a causal relationship between choice of privatisation and mortality. That graph is effectively
the right hand side section of our figure 1 except that ‘mortality belt’ is repackaged as ‘mass
privatisers’. Our figure 1 suggests that, at most, one could argue that those countries that
happened to mass privatise are also those that in both historical and contemporary terms have
suffered greater fluctuations in, and lower levels of, health. Notwithstanding this, it is instructive
to look more closely at the basic temporal association between mass privatisation and mortality.
Table 1 details the countries that Stuckler et al classify as mass privatisers, the year in which they
are said to have started that process and the year in which their mortality levels peaked.
Table 1: Mass privatisation and male mortality
Country Year of mass
privatisation
Year of peak
mortality
Armenia 1994 1993
Czech Republic 1992 1990
Georgia 1995 1993
Kazakhstan 1994 1996
Kyrgyz Republic 1994 1995
Latvia 1994 1994
Lithuania 1993 1994
Moldova 1994 1995
Romania 1995 1996
Russia 1992 1994
Ukraine 1995 1995
Interestingly, in 5 of the 11 countries, the year denoted as the start of mass privatisation either
coincides with or comes after the peak in male mortality. Using Stuckler et al’s data, Figure 2
shows that for both groups there was a steep increase in mortality followed by a decline. The peak
in the mass privatisers mortality rate comes in 1994, by which time, only Lithuania, Russia21 and
the Czech Republic can be considered to have meaningfully commenced mass privatisation in a
way that could plausibly show through in the mortality data, and in the latter case mortality had
long since peaked.
Figure 2: Log male mortality rates
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Figure 3 isolates the trends for each of these 3 countries (Russia, Lithuania and Czech Republic)
for whom mortality peaked after mass privatisation and for the overall trend among mass
privatisers once those 3 countries are removed. By the time that mass privatisation could have
plausibly impacted upon mortality rates in Russia and Lithuania, mortality was coming towards
the end of its steep rise, while in the Czech Republic it was already well into a steep decline and
continued despite mass privatisation. Once these countries are removed from the aggregate
analysis, Figure 2 paints an even clearer picture. That is, on average, countries embarking on
mass privatisation in 1994 or later enjoyed an immediate decline in male mortality. Indeed, the
stylised empirical fact is simple: in those countries that undertook it, mass privatisation either
takes place near the end of, at the end of or after the end of a significant and well-established
increase in male mortality. This is a reality that is very difficult to tally with the claims of
Stuckler et al.
Figure 3: Log male mortality in Russia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and mass privatisers
without Russia, Lithuania and Czech Republic
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4. The Econometrics
Our goal here is not to establish per se what does cause mortality. Rather, we are concerned to
demonstrate that there is no evidence in the data used by Stuckler et al that mass privatisation
resulted in increased mortality. We therefore devote a little time to discussing their data and
approach to estimation. Stuckler et al present results of the following model, estimated through a
pooled OLS technique, adjusted for the presence of both serial correlation and correlation
between countries:
AMRit = α + β1PRIVit + β2GDPit + β3LIBit + β4TRADEit + β5DEMit + β6DEPit + β7WARit
+ β8URBAN + β9EDUCit + μi + εit
The subscripts i and t refer to country and time; AMR refers to the log of the adult male mortality
rate, PRIV is the privatisation measure (we use their dummy variable in this paper), GDP relates
to log GDP per head in current $US, LIB is the EBRD price liberalisation index, TRADE is the
EBRD foreign exchange and trade liberalisation index, DEM is the Freedom House
democratisation index, DEP is the dependency ratio, WAR is their World Bank derived dummy
for military conflict, URBAN is the percentage of population in urban settings and EDUC is the,
World Bank sourced, percentage of population with tertiary education.
A number of the variables in their data are problematic. First, their proxy for the level of
development (GDP per capita) is denominated in current US$ rather than international $ adjusted
for purchasing power parity. This is a mistake – it is essential to use purchasing power parity $
measures in cross-country regressions that estimate health outcomes. Second, the choice of the
EBRD variables (LIB and TRADE) is arbitrary and runs against the accepted norm in the
transition literature22: it is well established there that due to serious multicollinearity between the
reform indicators and the risk of ommitted variable bias the preferred approach either calls on the
aggregate EBRD index or simply uses one of the sub-indices as a proxy for reforms. Indeed, in
this case, using either LIB or TRADE produces a significant result, further suggesting that
multicollinearity is a relevant point to consider in this case. 23 Third, the World Bank data they
use to proxy for education is highly problematic and known to be of low quality. Indeed,
choosing alternative World Bank education proxies directly reverses the observed direction of
association.
Amplifying the effects of these data use choices, Stuckler et al seem to overlook the importance
of the data coverage itself. Although the estimation techniques that they use to derive their results
are able to handle unbalanced panel data, the assumption that the gaps in the data are random is
still relied upon, and yet it is unlikely that this holds in reality. Examining their panel we observe
that for 6 countries the first year observed is 1989, while for the remainder the first observation
varies from 1990 to 1993. It is most unlikely, as our figure one suggests, that this unbalancing of
the panel is without consequence.24 Additionally, the main results discussed in their paper are
based on a pooled OLS model and yet there is neither discussion nor testing of the
appropriateness of pooling this data.25
Turning to the estimates themselves, Stuckler et al reduce to Webappendix 2 their discussion of
other confounding explanations for the observed mortality patterns. While they appear to explore
the role of health service variables, they neither discuss the problems surrounding these variables
in the post-communist context nor do they give consideration to the consumption of demerit
goods such as tobacco and alcohol. Indeed, as Leon et al note “Although factors such as nutrition
and health services may be involved, the evidence is that substantial changes in alcohol
consumption over the period could plausibly explain the main features of the mortality
fluctuations observed”.26 Reliable aggregate data on health service characteristics and on
consumption behaviour are difficult to identify but some attempt needs to be made to control for
the factors that might explain the long run trends that pre-date the transition (and privatisation)
period. Moreover, the authors’ assertion that by using fixed effects models they control for “pre-
existing societal characteristics and predispositions to higher mortality” is simply wrong. While
the fixed effects of these variables are indeed netted out in their effects models, any time-varying
or interactive effects are still swept into the error term.
This observation leads us to our most substantive criticism – their choice of estimator. Despite all
the evidence and intuition suggesting that they should, they fail to treat mortality as a dynamic
variable with the characteristic traits of persistence. Indeed, all of their presented estimates are
static and ignore several likely reasons for correlation over time in the dependent variable. First, it
can’t be other than that mortality in t is influenced directly by mortality in t-1 (true state
dependence explanation). If, for example, mortality this year is caused by low vaccination rates
20 years ago then it follows that, for the same reason, mortality next year will be caused, in part,
by the same factor. Second, mortality is affected directly, over time, through the explanatory
variables (observed heterogeneity explanation). In the case of mass privatisation, for example, it
is much more probable that mass privatisation last year would impact on mortality this year,
rather than the impact being contemporaneous. Finally, if important variables are omitted, as
explained above, then there could be a high individual fixed effect in each period that distorts the
results (unobserved heterogeneity explanation). None of their specifications are dynamic; while
they use the Prais Winsten correction for serial correlation in one of their specifications,
recognising that there is serial correlation in the error term, they fail to take into account that, if
the process is dynamic, then none of their OLS, fixed effect, random effects, Prais-Winsten or
first differenced estimates are consistent.27 The second reason we take issue with their estimator
also relates to the nature of the relationships they discuss. Despite explaining in their text that
GDP per head is endogenous to health outcomes, they fail to attempt to attenuate the bias that this
imparts upon all estimated coefficients and standard errors. Using an instrumental variables
approach within a dynamic panel setting allows us to attenuate this endogeneity induced bias.
5. Revisiting the results
We support the criticism presented above with a series of specifications, using Stuckler et al’s
data; the results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 below. Our intention is not to make claims
regarding what does actually explain the observed mortality patterns. In that sense, we are less
ambitious than Stuckler et al. Rather, using their data, we simply set out to demonstrate that the
association they observe between mass privatisation and mortality is a spurious one. Table 2
examines the effects of correcting their specifications in a step-wise manner, while Table 3
demonstrates the effect of using a dynamic panel estimator which allows for endogeneity and
time persistence in the dependent variable.
In Table 2, the first column replicates the key results obtained by Stuckler et al to which they
refer in the main text of their paper.28 Columns 2 and 3 show the results after using the correct
measurements and reducing what we consider to be overspecification, while column 4 adds the
initial mortality rate into the model. Columns 2-4 are important to the extent that they improve the
fit of the model and indeed lower the number of deaths implied by the mass privatisation
coefficient. They don’t though challenge the main qualitative claim of Stuckler et al. To achieve
the latter we recall our argument above that the impact of reforms on health inevitably comes
with some delay. For example, a mass privatisation programme introduced in December 1992 and
completed in June 1994 is unlikely to have had any effects on Russia’s 1992 mortality rates (as
implied by Stuckler et al’s specifications). In general, programmes introduced mid-year are more
likely to have effects in the following year.29 Column 5 therefore introduces lags for those
variables that cannot reasonably be argued to have an immediate impact on mortality rates. This
column is a gesture towards a more dynamic framework and it immediately removes the
significance of mass privatisation as an explanatory variable. Column 6 confirms this by using the
column 2 specification amended only for a lag in the mass privatisation variable. That is, the
inclusion of a simple lag in the key policy variable shows that mass privatisation last year does
not have any statistical impact on male mortality rates this year.30 Stuckler et al’s headline story
simply does not stand up to careful interrogation.
Table 2: Dependent variable, log male mortality rates, as in Stuckler et al (2009)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for mass privatisation 0.128***(0.025)
0.114***
(0.026)
0.102***
(0.025)
0.102***
(0.025)
lagged one year 0.028(0.030)
0.052
(0.029)
Log GDP per head -0.119***(0.028)
Log GDP per head (ppp) -0.160*(0.066)
-0.198**
(0.070)
-0.198**
(0.070)
-0.241**
(0.086)
lagged one year -0.176*(0.079)
EBRD Price liberalisation index 0.006(0.013)
0.000
(0.013)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.008
(0.013)
0.002
(0.014)
lagged one year 0.015(0.013)
EBRD Forex and trade lib index 0.009(0.013)
0.005
(0.005)
0.017
(0.011)
Freedom House democracy indicator -0.010(0.006)
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.015*
(0.006)
Military or ethnic conflict 0.224***(0.049)
0.207***
(0.050)
0.200***
(0.051)
0.200***
(0.051)
0.223***
(0.050)
0.197***
(0.045)
Population dependency ratio 0.017***(0.004)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.016**
(0.005)
% Pop with tertiary education -0.003*(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
% Pop in urban settings 0.032***(0.009)
0.028**
(0.009)
0.024*
(0.011)
0.024
(0.011)*
0.028**
(0.010)
Initial period mortality rate 0.818(0.201)***
0.775***
(0.216)
Rho 0.356 0.426 0.461 0.461 0.437 0.397
No of country-years 289 286 286 286 263 263
No of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Wald Chi squared 192023 91134 211535 459258 179017 17653
Notes: All estimations are pooled OLS with errors corrected for AR(1) serial correlation and heteroskedasticity and with
country dummies included. Robust panel corrected standard errors in brackets; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
Column (1) refers to the main results of the Stuckler et al paper; (2) replaces their GDP variable with the correct version; (3)
removes highly correlated democracy (with GDP), EBRD Forex indicator and education; (4) adds a control for initial
conditions and (5) presents the same but with lagged explanatory variables; (6) presents (2) but with a lagged mass
privatisation variable.
However, given the dynamic and potentially endogenous nature of the relationships we need to
incorporate the process of dynamic adjustment explicitly in order to obtain consistent estimates,
as explained above. For that reason we next adopt the Blundell and Bond General Methods of
Moments approach (‘system GMM’).31 This estimator achieves consistency, including for
unbalanced panels, through adopting an instrumental variables technique in which the lags of the
included variables provide the instruments. These estimates further highlight the deficiencies of
an approach that ignores the mortality patterns prior to and during mass privatisation. In each of
our dynamic specifications, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable indicates a level of
persistence hard to ignore without introducing bias.32
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the dynamic version of the Stuckler et al model and confirms that
mass privatisation is not a significant determinant of male mortality. Columns 2 and 3 speculate
on possible extensions of this. In particular, column 2 treats GDP as endogenous, introduces
initial conditions as predetermined and removes the variables identified in the earlier discussion
as problematic. Column 3 repeats that exercise but, in the spirit of our table 2 findings, uses
lagged independent variables to allow explicitly for the possibility that changes in key variables
in the last period influence mortality. 33 In neither case is mass privatisation’s contribution to
mortality significantly different from zero.
The results presented in tables 2 and 3 highlight five key findings: first, mass privatisation does
not explain the observed fluctuations in male mortality; second, the most likely explanation for
Stuckler et al’s claim is that they ignore the dynamics that must underpin any association between
policy and mortality; third, the other variables in their specification are also unable to explain
fluctuations in mortality; fourth, there is evidence, concordant with Sachs (1996), that liberalising
reforms actually served to reduce mortality during transition;34 and fifth, higher initial mortality
levels were associated with higher increases, as suggested by Figure 2.
Table 3: Dynamic GMM Estimations.
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3)
Lagged Dependent variable 0.882***(0.070)
0.881***
(0.095)
0.918***
(0.074)
Dummy for mass privatisation 0.040(0.027)
-0.002
(0.029)
lagged one year 0.011(0.031)
Log GDP per head (ppp) -0.002(0.016)
-0.049
(0.044)
lagged one year 0.028(0.031)
EBRD Price liberalisation index -0.022(0.014)
-0.027**
(0.010)
lagged one year -0.026***(0.007)
EBRD Forex and trade lib index -0.028***(0.009)
Freedom House democracy indicator 0.002(0.004)
Military or ethnic conflict -0.014(0.024)
-0.010
(0.029)
Population dependency ratio 0.001(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
% Pop with tertiary education 0.002(0.001)
0.003
(0.003)
% Pop in urban settings 0.001(0.002)
-0.000
(0.002)
Initial period mortality rate 0.083(0.093
0.148*
(0.085)
No of country-years
No of countries 261 261 261
Wald Chi squared 24 24 24
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): z 4317*** 2130*** 1085***
Hansen test: chi squared 0.528 0.462 0.399
16.9 19.0 21.2
Notes: System GMM estimates, standard errors in brackets; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
Column (1) refers to the dynamic estimate of Stuckler et al’s main results, using the correct GDP measure;
(2) treats GDP as endogenous and introduces initial conditions; (3) explores the same specification with lags.
6. Conclusion
There is no evidence that mass privatisation in the post-Communist world explains the observed
fluctuations in male mortality. The timing of mass privatisation is not consistent with the claim,
the historical trends in the regions mortality patterns are not consistent with the claim, and the
claim itself does not stand up to econometric analysis. The contrary finding, reported by Stuckler
et al, stems from their ignoring of the dynamics and persistence that necessarily underpins any
such relationship. Even using their data (which as we indicated is problematic) and their
specification, the inclusion of a simple one period lag, removes the association. Incorporating a
more explicitly dynamic estimation, there is still no link between mortality and mass privatisation
and moreover, there is some evidence that it was not privatisation but liberalising reforms that
had an impact on health and that such reforms were actually associated with lower mortality.
However, we make no claim that the specification in column (3) of Table 3 provides ultimate
proof about the factors that affected mortality in transition countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Such a claim would require further research, richer data allowing for a more precise attempt to
capture the behavioural elements of health determinants, and (preferably) corroboration with
micro-level data. Relying on cross-country studies with just 24 units of observation renders any
such claim highly speculative. However, for a group of countries that went through such a
distinctive time pattern of health outcomes, socio-economic performance, and reforms, with
economic and health results deteriorating over the late communist period and early transition
period and then improving later on, albeit not everywhere, ignoring the dynamic aspects of the
data comes at a seriously high cost in the form of mistaken conclusions. Yet such conclusions
matter: they matter for policy makers in emerging market economies; they matter for countries
seeking to understand the health problems they face; and they matter for academics, practitioners
and policy makers alike as they too seek to understand the downstream effects of upstream social
and economic choices.
Finally, we allow ourselves a little speculation consistent with our estimates. While privatisation
could lead to a reduction in employment in privatised companies, one has to remember that some
of those initial jobs were value-destroying35 and arguably a much more important issue pertained
to whether jobs were generated in the newly emerging private sector. This being so, the question
of liberalisation and freedom of entry may well be a more important one than the question of
privatisation, when trying to understand individual level health and socioeconomic outcomes.
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